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COMMENTARY: MEETING THE FINANCIAL
NEEDS OF CHILDREN
David L. Chambers*
Those who drafted the equitable distribution statutes
adopted in New York and elsewhere wanted to help assure
women and children an acceptable level of financial well-being
after divorce. Marsha Garrison has shown that divorcing couples
rarely possess enough resources to attain financial well-being
even when they live together as a couple, let alone when they
live in two separate households. She has also shown that, even in
the cases of couples with substantial assets, the broad and general language of the equitable distribution statute did not lead
(and could not have been expected to lead) to consistent distributions that assured economic well-being for divorcing women.
She has shown in short that equitable distribution could never
have lived up to the high hopes some people had for it.
Professor Garrison has performed the first major empirical
study in any state comparing property divisions and alimony
and child support orders before and after a state's adoption of
equitable distribution. This massive and impressive inquiry has
taken six years to complete. In this essay, I will make some brief
comments about the values and demands of the empirical inquiry she undertook and then some slightly longer comments on
the implications of her findings on child-support orders.
I know something about the demands of empirical research
from painful experience. During the 1970s I worked on a similar
large project studying child support in Michigan-not to understand, as Professor Garrison has, how much the orders were
before or after some event, but rather to understand about collections, about who pays and who doesn't and why. Like Professor Garrison, I gathered information from courthouse records.
When she tells you that she examined two thousand cases in
three counties from two different periods of time, it may sound
as if she just breezed into some public office, informed some po* Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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lite and obsequious clerk that she planned to poke around in
their files, took a few hours to scribble down the information she
wanted and then wrote up the results. Not at all. Merely getting
access to the files requires delicate diplomacy. Of course, court
officials need to protect the privacy of the people whose files are
to be examined, but often officials who talk the language of protecting privacy are really most interested in protecting themselves from exposure of their ineptness. If a researcher does gain
access to the files, she discovers that many of the files are missing and that, in the files that aren't missing, much of the information she thought would be there is not. And what is there
turns out to take vastly longer to code, to get into a computer,
and to analyze than any average person would imagine. For Professor Garrison, this has not merely been a project. It's been a
career. We should all be grateful to her for devoting such a large
chunk of her professional life to this inquiry.
And to what end? Some people hear about these huge empirical projects and ask, with doubt in their voices, are they really needed? Do we gain new insights from them or do they just
demonstrate what was intuitively obvious already? I believe that
we typically learn a great deal from carefully designed studies,
though I know others have doubts. When I completed my own
work on child support, for example, I believed that I had shown
that jailing parents for nonpayment of child support could make
a difference in collecting payments. I remember relating my
findings at a meeting of public employees whose job it was to
collect support payments. At the end of the presentation, one
gentleman who had been in the business a long time, came up to
me and said quizzically, "Now let me see if I understand. You
found that if you throw people in jail, they'll pay up some
money to get out," and I said "yes," and he said, "and that if
you throw a lot of people in jail, it may scare some other people
into paying," and I said "yes," "and it cost you $250,000 to find
that out," and I said "yes" again and he shook his head sadly
and said, "Well, you know, you should have talked to me. I
could have saved you a whole lot of trouble and a whole lot of
money."
Professor Garrison's findings are different. She's found a lot
that is not intuitively obvious. She's shown in several ways why
hopes for equitable distribution laws have not been fulfilled.
Even if you had a hunch that the equitable distribution law
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wasn't working as intended, it's important to build a solid factual underpinning for that hunch, the solid underpinning provided by her findings about property distribution, about alimony, and about child support.
With regard to property rules, for example, Professor Garrison has amply demonstrated a point most of us would have
guessed if we'd thought about it but that needs repeatedly to be
brought home: Most divorcing couples simply do not have a lot
of property. For them it doesn't make any difference what the
property distribution rules are. The inadequacy of available assets is, of course, routinely a problem in the divorces of couples
with young children. Most couples with young children are in
their twenties or thirties, and most of the little property they
have is not liquid-a car and some furniture. That finding leads
Professor Garrison to one of her central conclusions and recommendations: it is time to place the emphasis not on property distribution but on income and post-divorce sharing of income.
Professor Garrison recommends a different approach to alimony and child support that has several features. The most important of these is that it should mandate child support in an
amount "that would equalize the post-divorce standard of living
of the children and their custodial parent with the standard of
living of the noncustodial parent." Keeping the custodial parent
and children on an equal footing with an absent parent is a worthy goal. I want to show you how very far we are from reaching
it.
Assume, if you will, the prototype American family of the
twentieth century-a wife, a husband and two children, ages one
and three. This sort of family still exists. The parents divorce.
The children remain with the mother. Since their birth, she has
been a full-time caretaker. Assume further that the husband
(and thus the family as a whole in this case) has an adjusted
gross income of $40,000, which Professor Garrison reports is the
median family income for the families in her study. Let's look at
the child support that would be awarded in this case under various approaches.
As a starting point, how much child support would have
been ordered in this case in New York at the time that Professor
Garrison conducted her study? Within her sample, she found
that combined alimony and child support averaged twenty percent of the gross income of the noncustodial parent when the
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noncustodial parent earned $40,000 or more. Twenty percent of
$40,000 is $8,000. Thus in our example, the wife and two children would have to survive on $8,000. The father would end up
with $32,000 minus taxes. The mother and children would live in
poverty. The father would lose the housekeeping services his
wife provided but would have an income that permitted him to
live in comfort. In fact, he could afford to live at a higher standard of living on his remaining income than he did when he
shared his earnings with his wife and children.
Professor Garrison was reporting on New York in 1984.
What would today's child support schedule provide in New
York? Responding to an act of Congress, New York has adopted
a set of tables that fix appropriate child support orders. In our
example of a family with two children, the scedule would call for
ordering the noncustodial parent to pay twenty-five percent of
his adjusted gross income for child support alone. Alimony
would probably not be ordered in a marriage this short. Twentyfive percent of an income of $40,000 would provide $10,000 for
the mother and two children and $30,000 for the father. There
would, it is obvious, still be a huge difference between their standards of living.
Now stop for a second. What would it take to put the
mother and two children at the same standard of living with the
father after divorce if the two households shared his income of
$40,000. It would take an order not of twenty-five percent of the
father's income, but an order of at least sixty percent of his income. Thus, for the family with two children, support orders
would have to be over twice as high a percentage of earnings as
the orders are today. Even if the mother in our example earned
$10,000 a year herself (after expenses for child care), thus making the total family income $50,000, the order would still need to
be nearly half of the father's income to produce an equal standard of living in the two houses.
Why is it that the new, federally mandated, state schedules
such as New York's have not set child support orders high
enough to produce such equal standards of living for the separated households? Why not orders of fifty or sixty percent of the
noncustodial parents' incomes? I think there are several reasons.
One that is frequently stated is that child support is not intended to support the custodial parent. It is solely intended to
support the children. Economists then try to separate out the
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costs solely related to the children. But we all know that children cannot be assured a particular standard of living while living with a caretaker without taking into account the expenses of
the caretaker, since the caretaker and children will obviously
share the same pool of income.
Another asserted justification for lower orders is that if noncustodial parents are subjected to very high orders they are
thought likely to flee or to make even greater efforts to evade
the support orders than they do today. These predictions may
be sound, although in the current era, which relies much more
heavily on income withholding than in the past-taking the
money due out of noncustodial parents' paychecks before they
cash them-the claims that higher orders will produce higher
default levels are unproven.
Finally, there is a third, more fundamental, reason for refusing to equalize standards of living. Deep down many of us still
believe that the income really does belong to the income earner,
that the person under an order of support deserves to keep the
larger share. For most Americans, work in the labor force involves a lot of drudgery. On the other hand, so, of course, does
raising children.
To be sure, there are drawbacks, to setting orders much
higher than they are today. Doubling orders would exacerbate a
problem that already exists: if we set very high orders, do we
need to adjust them later to take into account the custodial parents' income if over time that income rises substantially? If the
custodial parent remarries, she and the children could, in an era
with much higher orders, end up with a substantially higher
standard of living than the support-paying abient parent. Modifying orders on her remarriage would help ensure that living
standards remained equal. On the other hand, the prospect that
orders will be modified might deter custodial parents from remarrying. By much the same token, setting very high orders
could exert a huge impact on the noncustodial parents' life-on
his financial capacity to remarry and on the standard of living
he could maintain if he does remarry, especially if he starts a
new family. Of course, we can assert glibly that the first family
comes first, but that's a harsh position to take for the new child
of the second marriage, who had no choice about her birth order.
Adjusting support orders also carries with it the risk that angry
noncustodial parents might start new families simply as an ex-
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cuse to pay less to their earlier-born children.
Let's look to the future. Will states ever devise systems of
child support that truly meet children's needs? How would a
truly adequate and effective "child-support system work? It
would include, of course, much higher orders. But that is not
enough. Such a system also needs to include more effective ways
of collecting the amounts ordered, even though the states have
made remarkable strides in collection techniques in the recent
past. I will close with a few speculations about what a more effective system of collection might look like. Under the old regime, still widely relied on despite new federal laws, a court sets
child-support orders, orders noncustodial parents to make certain payments every week or every couple of weeks and expects
them to write checks after getting their paychecks. The parent is
supposed to mail the check to some court clerk's office that distributes it to the custodial parent. Contemplate for one horrible
moment what would happen if the federal government tried to
collect income taxes that way, asking us to mail in a check every
week for that week's taxes. It is not hard to understand why the
federal government shifted in 1940 to payroll deductions. It is
also not hard to understand why much of the movement in the
last decade has been toward taking child support out of parents'
paychecks before they actually receive the paycheck. By 1994
the states, except in unusual cases, are supposed to require wage
deductions for all new orders of support.
For all its worth, the payroll deduction system states are
and will be using is still a clumsy business. In the first place,
under the current system, the state has to find the employer of
the noncustodial parent before it can issue an effective wage deduction order. If the parent changes employers and, as often
happens, fails to notify the court or the clerk, the state has to
identify the new place of employment and place another wage
deduction order in effect.
Can a better system be developed? While I cannot prescribe
a perfect system, I can certainly envision a more effective one, at
least on paper. We would need to adopt a national system for
collecting support to replace the state-based system we have today. The system would work in much the same way that withholding for federal income taxes works, though not quite. It cannot work quite the same way because, as to taxes, employers
know that they have to withhold for every employee whereas
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only some employees are under obligations to pay child support.
So, under my imaginary scheme, the law would require employers to check through a national computer system to learn, for
each employee, whether an order is in effect. The employer
would then simply start withholding, sending the ordered
amount to some federal agency that would be expected to turn
around and forward it to the custodial parent.
Of course, I quiver as you do at the thought of a newly enlarged federal bureaucracy charged with handling these transactions. Nonetheless, in several European countries such a system
has been in effect for many years, and in fact, some countries
have gone one step further. In these countries, once an order of
wage deduction is put into effect, the government starts making
payments to the custodial parent without waiting for the money
actually to come through the pipeline from the parent under the
order of support. The government assumes the burden of collecting the money from the noncustodial parent. Our federal
government may never be ready to take on that substantial a
risk, but it would be a risk it might choose to assume if we as a
nation were genuinely committed to the needs of children.
Now of course, even the improved system that I've sketched
has huge gaps. The biggest gaps are for the self-employed, for
whom a wage deduction system obviously cannot work, and for
the unemployed and sporadically employed, for whom a better
economy is the first indispensable requirement. Still, what I recommend would almost certainly be more effective than what we
have today. Will we ever actually adopt such a system? I rather
doubt it. My points both on the size of the child-support orders
and on the collection system are mostly a way of demonstrating
just how far we have to go in this country if children are to come
first. Professor Garrison's splendid research has helped illuminate the scale of the problems still facing us.
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G. Oliver Koppell*
I would like to give my thoughts in response to Professor
Garrison's work, and comment tangentially on some of the other
commentators' points as well. First, I'm not sure that Professor
Garrison's overall conclusion that equitable distribution is a failure is fair. It is fair to say that her study shows that the current
system of distribution of property and support of ex-spouses and
children isn't working very well. But such a conclusion does not
necessarily mean that equitable distribution is a failure, especially considering that her study, interestingly enough, shows
that equitable distribution is largely irrelevant to the issue of
how parties live after divorce. That, perhaps, is the most surprising outcome. For the vast majority of men, women and children,
the whole issue is essentially irrelevant because there is not
enough property to really make a difference. What she also
shows is that where there is enough property to make a difference, the results are not very consistent. I don't think Professor
Garrison has been able to show-because I don't think any
study could show-that in individual instances shifting away
from a title-based system did not allow for more flexibility and
therefore more fairness.
I suggest that there are many cases, maybe not statistically
significant but certainly significant to the participants in those
cases, where equitable distribution helped to achieve a better result than would a title-based system. And I don't think Professor Garrison would counsel going back to a title-based system to
cure the problems of equitable distribution. I doubt there are
many people around who would say we should go back to that
system, even though, according to the research, under that system the results were not very different than the results after the
system. Her study points out that equitable distribution does
not solve basic fairness problems, and as a result of the enactment of equitable distribution we made other changes in the di* Chair, New York State Assembly Committee on the Judiciary.
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vorce law, particularly with respect to permanent alimony or
maintenance, that not only didn't help the situation, but perhaps in many instances made it worse. On that point though, I
might suggest that changes in societal attitudes about the capabilities and role of women had as much to do with what happened in the courts with respect to alimony and maintenance as
the change in the law, and we might well have changed the law
with respect to alimony or maintenance even if we hadn't enacted equitable distribution.
So going back to the question of whether we should or
should not have passed the equitable distribution law or that
part of the law which dealt with abolishing title, I don't think
the report suggests that passing the law was a bad idea. Rather,
we should recognize that by adopting equitable distribution we
didn't solve many problems some people thought would be
solved. If Professor Garrison's research had been available in
1979, those disappointed with the equitable distribution law
would have known to begin with that it wouldn't have solved the
problems, because the money just wasn't there. Unfortunately,
we in the legislature didn't take the time to determine how few
people equitable distribution would affect. Now, looking at the
effect of the equitable distribution law, the question arises where
should we go from here, where should we go as a legislature?
First of all, let me say that some of us in the legislature,
even before Professor Garrison's study, have understood that
there are problems with the system that equitable distribution
has not been able to solve and that therefore still need to be
changed. First of all, certainly, many of us from the very beginning believed that the distribution of property should be equal,
not equitable, or at least there should be a presumption of
equality. I know that was my position way back when and the
position of many others. Equitable was essentially the result of a
compromise with those members who opposed any change. It
was my view that we should have a more predictable standard:
that the standard should be a presumption of equal. Even today,
I'm not sure we shouldn't move further toward the California
model, which is based on community property.
Many of us from the very beginning believed, and I still believe, that we ought to have at least a presumption of equal. I
don't mind tinkering with the presumption in the ways that Professor Garrison suggests, in terms of providing more than equal
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where that's appropriate, especially in low-income families or
low-asset families, and in dealing with the issue of occupancy
and control of the marital residence. Many of us also recognize
that we should further modify the law, although it is true that
since 1984, when Professor Garrison's study was done, there has
been a modification of the law reminding judges that they can
exercise their power to award permanent maintenance when
necessary. We should go further. In legislation that I've proposed, we would have the judge look at the standard of living
established during the marriage, and we would create a presumption of permanent maintenance or alimony in the case of
the long-term marriage.
I also agree with Professor Garrison on the need for adequate counsel for the parties. Professor Garrison indicated that
adequate counsel is one important predictor of a favorable outcome to the lower-income or lower-asset spouse (in most cases,
the wife). Again, in legislation I've proposed, we would provide
for a clearer mandate on judges to award counsel fees during the
course of litigation and we would provide standards for the
award of counsel fees that would look at the amounts paid by
the "monied" spouse for counsel, when determining how much
should be ordered to be paid by that spouse for the non-monied
spouse's attorney. So, I think that her study suggests that the
direction I and others in the legislature who have joined me are
going is the proper one, if we are to correct some of the other
problems suggested by the study.
Last, as discussed by Professors Garrison and Kay, is the
question of whether a no-fault standard of divorce makes any
difference in determining the financial outcome of the breakup
of the marriage. Professor Garrison's studies, in which she points
out that the vast majority of states in the United States are now
no-fault states, do not indicate that the financial outcome results
in New York are significantly different than the results reached
in other states. So, the fact that we have a fault-based system in
New York has not had the impact of awarding the economically
weaker spouse higher amounts of property. There remains, however, a perception that fault-based systems help the weaker
spouse, and this has engendered resistance to my proposals that
it is time to eliminate fault as a necessary element in divorces
where there is no consent. You can, of course, have a divorce on
a no-fault basis in New York with consent. Professor Garrison's
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study, and similar studies in other states, indicate that the fault
requirement is not particularly protective for women, at least as
a general matter. So, in the end I think that the study contributes to our understanding of what happens to people as a result
of divorce. I think the study supports moving from a standard of
equitable to a standard of equal. I think the study supports further modification of the standards judges should use when determining the award of maintenance or alimony. Maybe that can be
done through case law, maybe it doesn't require a statutory
change, but I would be happy to support such a statutory
change. I think the study recognizes the importance of providing
counsel to the parties. This issue is not limited to having the
monied spouse pay for all attorneys' fees, but also involves the
difficult problem of providing counsel when there is no money
on either side, which is very often the case. Here, we have unfortunately gone backwards in the last few years by reducing legal
aid to people who need or want a divorce. I also think that the
study does not support those who are opposed to adding an irreconcilable differences standard to New York's grounds for divorce. Such are my thoughts.
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